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Case study h b fuller case honduras street children and su

With growing ties to Mexican drug cartels, while assuming an ever-greater role in the transportation of cocaine transportista networks across the Isthmus, the gang is acquiring financial resources, advanced weaponry, and the ability and sophistication to wield increasing political power. Factions that once relied exclusively on violence and threats for control are now trying to win the hearts and minds of the communities in which they operate; taking concrete steps to consolidate themselves in the cocaine trade; and becoming credible alternatives to the state.

This transformation is not uniform across all gang structures nor is it the same from country to country. MS 13 is divided into neighborhood structures called clicas, which are grouped into programas that respond to the ranfla, or national leadership, in each country.

Each clica has responsibility for its own economic needs, as well as payments to the central leadership, meaning that each clica and each programa is different. These disparities make generalizations difficult because few things are universally true across the structures.

Even so, it is evident that MS 13 is operating with clearer strategic goals than in the past, and amassing political and economic power.

As a recent Freidrich Ebert Foundation report noted, Regarding the use of violence armed confrontations, homicides, extortions the behavior pattern of the contemporary gang appears to be guided by a high level of strategic logic. Taken together, the violent acts of the gangs become an instrument to protect the vital interest of the gang and broaden its opportunities. It is a reproductive rationale, which explains the search for new sources of economic, social and political power.

These members are now in positions to exercise influence on behalf of the gang in multiple spheres, with a far more sophisticated understanding of the world. Furthermore, the change was described as a conscious political decision to build a loyal political base moving forward. This is not to say that MS 13 has abandoned extortion; the decision in Honduras has not been replicated in El Salvador. Furthermore, payments from larger companies—e.

Case study h b fuller case honduras street children and su

The impact of such large business extortions has far less of an impact on communities, many of whom now actively support MS 13 efforts to expand their territorial control because of the halt to small business extortions. Control can change on a daily basis, adding to the stress, as does the constant worry that her young teenage daughter will be taken by one of the groups.

In conversations with gang leaders, they stated that it is easier now than at any time in recent memory to move migrants through Mexico because Mexican officials are much less rigorous in trying to halt them, because of the tension with the U. Government over the proposed border wall. This has served to greatly facilitate the movement of gang members back and forth to the United States.

  • Treasury Department, and agencies in Honduras also have been a major factor in allowing MS 13 to expand, particularly into rural areas traditionally controlled by long-standing transportista groups;
  • This does not imply an ideological or religious affinity toward those groups, but rather a willingness to look to those groups, via the internet, for successful military, economic and political strategies to further their own ends;
  • In El Salvador, the MS 13 leadership structure is in danger of undergoing a permanent fracturing, while in Honduras the leadership structure remains solid and disciplined;
  • The capacity of MS 13 in San Pedro Sula to carry out new military action is owed in part to the increased military training they are receiving and the improved weaponry they can now routinely access, including Uzi submachine guns, C4 explosives, RPGs, and new AK—47 and AR—15 assault rifles.

At the same time, according to both gang leaders and law enforcement officials across the region, the gangs are already beefing up their ranks due to the recent influx of gang members being deported from the United States. These members are immediately incorporated into the existing gang structures.

The gangs, particularly MS 13, are also offering immediate employment opportunities to other criminals with special skills, particularly in the financial and military fields. Recent judicial investigations into the activities of MS 13 in El Salvador uncovered a multi-million dollar structure of legitimate businesses owned by the gang. This included putting some notorious gang members on the government payroll in some municipalities. In negotiating the truce directly with the government, the gang leadership discovered for the first time that they had real political power.

  • The drug transport organizations wanted free passage through gang areas, the government wanted to lower homicide rates and the gangs wanted money;
  • Hi all i might have added something about this before i have recently been doing research for the book about resistol and found a very good website about the hb;
  • Each section contains a case study and relevant theoretical articles that range from classics in philosophy to modern commentaries by business practitioners case study;
  • In an effort to build a credible police force, the Honduran government, with U;
  • He was popular enough to inspire an unprecedented rebellion against the prison leadership, including a refusal to endorse new attempts at a truce, and other acts of defiance.

These revelations came a few months after another released audio recording, in which Valencia could be heard negotiating with gang leaders to obtain their support during the second round of the 2014 presidential elections.

Earlier recordings showed ARENA leaders offering to provide identity cards and financial rewards in exchange for the gang-controlled votes. The strategic objective of this rural territorial expansion is to control vital nodes of the regional illicit trafficking routes, primarily for cocaine, but also weapons, cash, and human beings, including illegal migrants, sex slaves, and others.

Newly controlled MS 13 areas, when plotted on a map, show that San Pedro Sula to the east and northeast is almost encircled by gang-controlled rural areas. This territory is key to the control of the crossroads that lead to puntos ciegos, or informal border crossings, vital to the flow of cocaine and precursor chemicals northward from Puerto Cortes on the Atlantic coast of Honduras to Puerto Barrios and Izabal in Guatemala. This expansion and control of rural areas is also reportedly taking place along the Honduras—Nicaragua border, reflecting the strategic decision by the gang leadership to seek control of important international nodes of the regional cocaine trafficking trade, a move that both increases their financial revenues and puts them in almost permanent conflict with other transportista groups who have operated in the regions for many years.

The capacity of MS 13 in San Pedro Sula to carry out new military action is owed in part to the increased military training they case study h b fuller case honduras street children and su receiving and the improved weaponry they can now routinely access, including Uzi submachine guns, C4 explosives, RPGs, and new AK—47 and AR—15 assault rifles.

According to regional law enforcement officials and gang leaders interviewed by the authors, this successful expansion is because of the unintended consequences of two actions by the U. In an effort to build a credible police force, the Honduran government, with U.

A core of more rigorously vetted and trained policemen are to fill the void in new police structures. However, the massive firings have been a boon to MS 13 because the gang now has money to hire many of them as security and trainers for gang activities.

According to a policeman who has been offered work by MS 13 and has several friends who have accepted the offer, MS 13 pays roughly 2. With the guidance of former security officers, many who have trained in the United States and elsewhere, MS 13 has reportedly set up military training camps in the Honduran province of Olancho. In the camps, to which the authors were denied access, training is provided by former policemen and former special forces combatants from the wars in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

These specialized criminal groups, often referred to as gangs although they do not adhere to traditional gang culture, have added significant new elements and crosscurrents to the violence in the region. These smaller groups are reportedly refining cocaine base in San Pedros, Honduras that arrives from Colombia and Venezuela into refined cocaine known as HCL.

This is partly the result of the difficulty in acquiring precursor chemicals in Colombia, and the case study h b fuller case honduras street children and su of flying cocaine base directly to Honduras. Rather than presenting a specific political platform beyond seeking direct benefits for the gang, MS 13 uses the sheer numbers of its members more than 35,000 in El Salvador—a country geographically the size of Massachusetts—and an equal or greater number in Honduras, according to police intelligence estimates and its vast territorial control as both carrots and sticks to subvert the electoral process in new and dangerous ways: MS 13 charges individual candidates from all parties several hundred dollars to several thousand dollars to be able set up a party organization and campaign in a neighborhood the gang controls.

The gang also bans certain politicians or political parties they view as enemies from campaigning in those areas. MS 13 has yet to participate financially in national campaigns but has directly financed mayors and local legislatures.

This has allowed the gang to move some of their own or those willing to do their bidding into municipal strongholds, and in some documented cases the mayors have hired gang members as municipal employees.

In growing areas in both Honduras and El Salvador, the more powerful clicas and programas of MS 13 have filled the void of an absent national government by carrying out significant state functions. This is not universally true; other clicas, especially those that are not on routes needed by networks to move cocaine or other illicit products, continue to operate at the more rudimentary level traditionally associated with the gangs.

The Fragmentation of the State and Gang Governance Several recent publications have described the gangs as having created a parallel state, where they are politically and economically empowered and have replaced the formal state. For those clicas and programas with the most resources in and around San Pedro Sula usually derived from a more formal alliance with the regional cocaine transporting networksthe activities in their neighborhoods include: Creating rudimentary literacy programs, primarily designed to help their members to be able to communicate with each other with cellular telephones, but open to some others in the community.

Most of the material for these home operations of a few sewing machines per shop is stolen from the large international maquilas that operate across San Pedro Sula.

  • The transformation is also visible in other ways;
  • It is surprising to see now the boys are wearing dress shirts, dress pants and nice shoes.

These clear efforts to change the perception of MS 13 among the communities in which they live also includes rebranding themselves a La Familia rather than gang members, or mareros. In many parts of San Pedro Sula, the governing clicas have painted over their old gang graffiti on the walls in an effort to present themselves as a more responsible and mature group.

The transformation is also visible in other ways. They are the maximum authority. They extort, kill and walk around armed through the market with total impunity…The gang member who comes by to collect the extortion every Saturday morning comes well-dressed. It is surprising to see now the boys are wearing dress shirts, dress pants and nice shoes.

Case study h b fuller case honduras street children and su

They even wear glasses to look like intellectuals. They carry a backpack and a notebook, and the accounting for what is owed by each stall inside the market is accurate. They know how much each stall should pay because the quotas are different depending on what the owner is selling and the size of the business. For example, a fruit vendor will be charged less than those selling clothes and shoes. We are never late with our payments.

The Evolution of MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras

It would cost us our lives. In these relationships, gang members primarily operate as hired transporters for multi-ton loads of cocaine transportistasand control the retail markets of crack and cocaine narcomenudeo. This shift in behavior and thinking has not occurred in other gangs or MS 13 in El Salvador. Although leaders of MS 13 in El Salvador are aware of how their counterparts in Honduras are working, they say that the gang in El Salvador has not yet found a replacement revenue stream to make up for what would be lost by dropping extortion as a primary financial source.

According to interviews with MS 13 leaders in Choloma, the sector of San Pedro Sula that led the move to stop local extortions, the decision had four components: Provide relief to small business in areas under their control—often family members and community members known to gang members and their families— by eliminating the gang policy that people most hated.

Leverage the relief into active political support for the gang by channeling some of the new drug wealth into rudimentary social programs, as described above, creating for the first time a more formal political face to the gangs.

Provide security for the communities by aggressively attacking other gangs and law enforcement units on the perimeter of the neighborhood, turning MS territory into a relative safe haven in the sea of surrounding violence. Leadership Divisions While MS 13 remains a formidable regional and transregional force with the ability to coordinate strategy, personnel movements and actions across national borders, leadership of the group in both Honduras and El Salvador said that the case study h b fuller case honduras street children and su are often now going their separate ways.

While the Salvadoran branch of MS 13 has been riven by internal strife as several of the most powerful subgroups threaten to fracture, the Honduran MS 13 is pioneering new and innovative political and social strategies that are expanding its reach. One of the biggest differences between MS 13 in El Salvador and its counterpart in Honduras is the nature of the leadership. MS 13 in Honduras has maintained a unified gang leadership, largely in prison, which has proved capable of strategic thinking, including: By contrast, MS 13 leadership in El Salvador is deeply divided.

This breach of gang protocol was viewed by many of the leaders and rank and file on the street as a betrayal worthy of death. There have been bloody purges and counter-purges in the gang as a result of the feeling on the street that the prison leadership betrayed the gang for personal profits.

The most visible leader of the internal revolt was Walter Antonio Carrillo Alfaro—a. He was popular enough to inspire an unprecedented rebellion against the prison leadership, including a refusal to endorse new attempts at a truce, and other acts of defiance.

A series of retaliatory murders took place, and the division reportedly still festers within the ranks of MS 13. El Piwa was released from prison under unclear circumstances in 2013, in the middle of the truce, and was then employed by the municipality of Ilopango.

El Piwa claimed to have left MS 13 altogether to become an evangelical pastor and occasionally appeared on TV as a preacher. The relatively successful law enforcement actions during the past three years by the U. Drug Enforcement Administration, the U. Treasury Department, and agencies in Honduras also have been a major factor in allowing MS 13 to expand, particularly into rural areas traditionally controlled by long-standing transportista groups. These actions effectively weakened or decapitated the most powerful Honduran transportista structures in the movement of cocaine, allowing MS 13 to greatly strengthen its role in the regional trafficking structures.

The traditional transportista network viewed the gangs as their main competition and fought long, hard, and successfully for a long time to marginalize the gangs from the cocaine transport business, although the gangs have long controlled local retail business.

The gangs had been unable to penetrate the drug transport trade in large part because the traditional groups could and would kill the case study h b fuller case honduras street children and su members when they tried to take over key routes.

However, with the leadership of the main competition summarily taken off the playing field, MS 13 was well-positioned to step into the void. Mexican organizations, desperate to keep their product moving safely through Honduras, opened the door for the alliances that have since blossomed. Decapitated bodies with severed limbs—the hallmark of MS 13 assassinations—mark the gang presence there.

The Growing Cost of the New Gangs It is almost impossible to overstate the damage to the fabric of society that gang-driven violence has caused, and the push factor this violence creates for illegal immigration to the United States. With the almost complete absence of the state, gang beheadings and dismemberment of victims are now routine; lynching and burning victims alive are commonplace; and the recruitment of children as young as 11 is an everyday occurrence.

Those who cannot afford to send their children out of the country are forced to seek safety in the shrinking areas of the national territory where the gangs are not fully in control. Tens of thousands of people have fled their homes due to gang expansion, violence and threats, primarily against minors who do not want to join. While many move to other neighborhoods or areas of the country to find shelter with families, an increasing number are now living in de facto displacement camps around the major cities, a reality the government has consistently refused to acknowledge.

Each step entails carrying out specific, usually violent acts, including murders, to prove loyalty to the gang.